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T
HE BOOK BEGINS with a quote from
J. H. Dales’ Pollution, Property, and
Prices,  “If  it  is  feasible  to  establish  a
market to implement a policy, no policy-
maker  can  afford  to  do  without  one.”
This  book  provides  important  evidence
in support of Dales’ statement by thor-
oughly examining the first several years
of the U.S. acid rain program. This inno-
vative  program  uses  a  cap-and-trade
approach,  rather  than  the  traditional
command-and-control  approach,  to  re-
duce sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions. The
book  offers  substantial  evidence  of  the
program’s success.
The analysis is of both practical and
scientific importance. From a practical
viewpoint, the acid rain program is an
ambitious effort to reduce a major pol-
lutant. It is important for us to under-
stand whether the program is successful
and how it might be improved. From a
scientific viewpoint, the authors’ analy-
sis provides a framework and methodol-
ogy for evaluating similar programs. There
is  much  we  can  learn  about  effective
regulation from the analysis.
Background.  Title  IV  of  the  1990
Clean Air Act Amendments created an
SO2 emissions trading program. SO2 is
one of the main pollutants responsible
for acid rain, which harms aquatic life
and  trees,  especially  in  the  northeast
U.S.  and  southeast  Canada.  In  1985,
electric utilities accounted for about 70
percent  of  the  SO2  emissions,  with
nearly all coming from coal-fired units.
Title IV imposes a national cap on SO2
emissions  from  electric  utilities.  Each
utility  is  given  allowances;  each  allow-
ance (or permit) entitles the holder to
emit one ton of SO2 in the vintage year
or  any  later  year.  On  an  annual  basis,
the  utility  must  have  sufficient  allow-
ances  in  its  account,  managed  by  the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
to cover its emissions. Title IV encour-
ages trading of the allowances in both
private markets and in an annual EPA
auction.
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2 University of Maryland. Before Title IV, air pollution in the
U.S.  was  governed  through  command-
and-control regulation. Specific rates of
emission  would  be set for a particular
pollution  source,  or  specific  control
technologies  would  be  required.  In-
stead,  Title  IV  sets  a  cap  on  national
emissions  of  SO2.  The  cap  was  set  to
reduce SO2 emissions by 10 million tons
per  year  from  1980  levels  by  the  year
2000.  In  Phase  I  (1995–99),  the  pro-
gram  applied  to  the  263  dirtiest  large
generating units. In Phase II (2000 and
beyond), the program applies to nearly
all fossil-fueled generating units.
By January 31 of each year, each util-
ity must turn over to the EPA sufficient
allowances to cover its emissions for the
year. Failure to do so results in substan-
tial  fines  and  further  emission  reduc-
tions. The utility receives an initial en-
dowment of allowances based largely on
historical heat input. Typically, the ini-
tial endowment is insufficient to main-
tain  the  status  quo.  The  utility  must
either  purchase  additional  allowances
(from  those  with  a  surplus)  or  reduce
its  emission  levels.  Abatement  can  be
accomplished in a number of ways: (1)
shifting generation from dirtier units to
cleaner  units,  (2)  changing  fuel  type
from dirtier fuel to cleaner fuel, and (3)
installing  scrubbers  that  remove  SO2
from the flue gas. In addition, since ex-
cess allowances can be banked for use
in later years, a utility can satisfy future
needs  by  over-complying  in  earlier
years.
The primary advantage of a cap-and-
trade program is that it provides incen-
tives for least-cost attainment of the en-
vironmental  goal,  in  this  case  the
mandated  reduction  in  SO2  emissions.
Efficient abatement is achieved in the-
ory, since the utility has the flexibility
to  employ  the  least-cost  abatement
techniques,  or  to  purchase  additional
allowances  if  others  can  reduce  emis-
sions more cheaply. All that is required
for  efficient  abatement  are  cost-mini-
mizing utilities and an efficient market
for allowances.
Since  1993,  the  EPA  has  conducted
an annual auction. About 2.8 percent of
the allowances are held back from the
utilities  and  sold  in  a  revenue-neutral
auction. Any party can buy or sell allow-
ances in this auction. The auction was
intended  to  stimulate  private  markets
by providing some early price signals. It
also reduced fears that entry would be
impeded by utilities hoarding allowances.
A  key  element  of  the  cap-and-trade
program  is  accurate  measurement  of
emissions. Title IV requires each utility
to install continuous emission monitor-
ing equipment, and imposes stiff penal-
ties  if  the  equipment  is  not  accurate.
The  EPA  also  maintains  a  database to
track each unit’s allowances over time.
Private  trades  of  allowances  are  re-
ported to the EPA and recorded in the
database.
Outline.  The  book’s  coverage  of  the
acid rain program is comprehensive. It
begins by looking at the political econ-
omy of the steps leading to the adoption
of  Title  IV.  This  helps  us  understand
the  political  constraints  that  led  to  its
ultimate design. Next the book analyses
the effects of Title IV on SO2 emissions,
the  compliance  strategy  of  firms,  the
performance of allowance markets, and
the cost of compliance. The cost savings
under  Title  IV  versus  traditional  com-
mand-and-control  are  estimated.  The
book concludes with lessons learned from
the  Title  IV  experience.  My  remarks
will follow this outline.
Politics. In understanding the politics
of  Title  IV,  there  are  two  main  ques-
tions.  Why  was  a  cap-and-trade  pro-
gram  adopted,  rather  than  command-
and-control?  And  how  should  the
allowances be allocated? There is little
in  the  book  on  the  first  question.
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and-trade  programs.  Certainly,  George
Bush’s  election  was  important  in  both
supporting the acid rain program gener-
ally,  and  a  market-based  approach  in
particular. A second factor was the rela-
tive simplicity of implementation. Most
of the SO2 pollution was coming from a
known  set  of  utilities.  Accurate  and
cost-effective measurement of emissions
was possible.
The  second  question—how  should
the  allowances  be  allocated?—is  a
thorny distributive matter. Not surpris-
ingly,  much  of  the  debate  focused  on
this  question,  as  each  special  interest
sought to shift the allocation in its fa-
vor.  The  program  potentially  provides
an excellent opportunity to test theories
of  distributive  politics, given the clear
outcome (a specific allocation) and the
high stakes (undiscounted estimates of
the  value  of  allowances  over  the  first
ten  years  of  Phase  II  ranged  between
$45 and $63 billion). The book performs
such  an  analysis.  However,  because of
the difficulties in measuring the inputs
to the distributive bargain, it is hard to
conclude too much from the outcome.
The  regression  results  do  not  support
any one theory of distributive politics.
The  authors  conclude  that  the  results
appear too complex to be captured by a
simple regression analysis.
Interestingly, the distributive analysis
takes as given that the allowances will
be  predominantly  “grandfathered”
based  on  historical  heat  input.  Appar-
ently, the option of awarding the allow-
ances to the public was never seriously
considered,  even  though  such  an  ap-
proach  has  some  economic  merit.  For
example, the publicly-owned allowances
could be auctioned with revenues going
to the Treasury, providing a distortion-
free revenue stream to offset distortion-
ary taxation. That the diffuse interests
of the taxpayers were ignored in favor
of  the  focused  interests  of  the  utility
industry  supports  a  Stigler-Peltzman
theory of distributive politics.
Performance. The first step in under-
standing the performance of Title IV is
creating  a  counterfactual  estimate  of
what  would  happen  to  SO2  emissions
without  Title  IV.  To  this  end,  the
authors study the pre-1995 trend in SO2
emissions. From 1985, despite increas-
ing generation, SO2 emissions fell. Pre-
1994, the decline in emissions is attrib-
utable  to  rail-rate  deregulation,  which
made it economical for some substitu-
tion  of  high-sulfur  coal  for  low-sulfur
coal. The subsequent analysis uses this
counterfactual benchmark in evaluating
the impact and cost of Title IV.
A visible success measure of any pro-
gram  is  compliance.  Here  Title  IV
shines. In the first three years, compli-
ance  was  perfect.  Indeed,  there  was
substantial  overcompliance,  with  most
utilities banking surplus allowances for
use in later years. Still, it is important to
understand how the utilities complied.
Roughly  37  percent  of  the  abatement
came from scrubbers, with the remain-
ing  coming  from  fuel  switching.  Fuel
switching  was aided by the substantial
drop in rail rates.
One of the potential flaws in the acid
rain  program  is  its  national  structure.
SO2  is  a  regional  pollutant.  Its  effects
may be felt hundreds of miles from the
source, but not thousands. Hence, there
was  a  possibility  that  the  abatement
would occur in the wrong spots. The al-
ternative  was  to  set  regional caps that
would  prevent  hot  spots,  but  reduce
trading  flexibility.  Thus  far,  hot  spots
have not developed. The greatest abate-
ment  occurred  in  regions  causing  the
biggest problems. I would contend that
there is some amount of good fortune in
this result. The economics simply made
it  attractive  for  the  most  problematic
polluters to abate. The authors raise an
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tendency for each utility to perform its
own  abatement,  rather  than  rely  on
trade.  Indeed,  only  one  utility  relied
significantly  on  the  purchase  of  allow-
ances. This would suggest that the eco-
nomic  gains  from  inter-utility  trading
may have been only partially realized.
Most  utilities  satisfied  Title  IV
through internal trading of allowances;
that  is,  trading  allowances  between
units  owned  by  a  single  utility,  rather
than trading between different utilities.
The utility would have some units with
surplus, and would apply this surplus to
meet shortages on other units. About 75
percent  of  current  allowance  demand
was met through internal trade. The re-
maining 25 percent was met with either
external  purchase  or  withdrawals  from
banked  allowances.  Despite  this  evi-
dence  of  the  importance  of  internal
trading, the external trading market was
important.  It  is  the  external  trading
market that provides a market price for
allowances.  This  price  information  is
essential  for  efficient  utility  decision
making. In any program like this, it is
natural for the internal trading opportu-
nities to be exploited first, but this does
not  mean  that  external  trading  is  any
less  important  in  promoting  long-run
efficiency.
Title IV includes a voluntary compli-
ance program, which allows the owners
of the 263 units under mandatory com-
pliance to satisfy their reductions from
other units. The owners voluntarily se-
lect the units they want to “opt in” to
the  program.  These  units  are  credited
with an allowance allocation. If the al-
lowance allocation is equal to the coun-
terfactual  emissions  (the  emissions  of
the unit had it not opted in), then this
added flexibility is desirable. Only units
with low abatement costs would have an
incentive to opt in. In practice, the al-
lowance allocation does not equal coun-
terfactual  emissions;  sometimes  it  is
high and sometimes it is low. This cre-
ates an adverse selection problem, since
those  units  with  low  counterfactual
emissions, relative to the allowance al-
location,  have  an  incentive  to  opt  in.
Hence,  the  voluntary  program  has  the
benefit  of  more  efficient  abatement,
but  at  a  cost  of  creating  excess  allow-
ances due to the adverse selection prob-
lem. The authors’ analysis reveals that
the  adverse  selection  was  a  problem.
The voluntary program appears to have
raised  SO2  emissions  by  between  1  to
2  million  tons,  without  having  a  sig-
nificant  impact  in  reducing  allowance
prices.
External Allowance Market. Next the
authors tackle the essential question of
whether  an  efficient  allowance  market
formed.  An  efficient  allowance  market
is  necessary  for  least-cost  abatement.
Otherwise  some  gains  from  trading
allowances will not be found.
One  remarkable  feature  of  the  SO2
allowance market is the absence of trade
restrictions.  There  are  no  restrictions
on who can trade allowances or on the
mechanism for trading. Allowances can
be traded nationally, and may be banked
for use in later years. This flexibility is key
to the success of the allowance market.
Title IV recognized the importance of
the development of private markets, but
established  an  annual  EPA  auction  to
promote  early  price  discovery  and  re-
duce  fears  of  allowance  hoarding  by
utilities. The two-sided auction works as
follows. Sellers submit offers to sell and
buyers  submit  bids  to  buy.  A  supply
curve  is  formed  by  sorting  the  offers
from  lowest  to  highest,  and  a demand
curve is formed by sorting the bids from
highest to lowest. Then the bids and of-
fers  are  matched,  beginning  with  the
highest buyer bid and the lowest seller
offer, with trade occurring between the
seller and buyer at the buyer’s bid. The
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maining  bid  is  less  than  the  lowest
remaining offer.
This would be a standard pay-your-bid
auction,  like  Treasury  auctions  before
November  1998,  but  for  the  fact  that
there are many sellers. With many sell-
ers, this auction creates strange incen-
tives. Each seller wants to be matched
with the highest bid, and this is accom-
plished  with  the  lowest  offer.  Hence,
seller offers are biased downward. Bid-
ding in such an auction involves a lot of
guesswork  by  both  buyer  and  seller.
Buyers  must  guess  what  the  clearing
price is likely to be and bid as close to
that as desirable. The sellers’ guesswork
is even more difficult. For example, if a
seller thinks that the price is likely to
be above its marginal cost of abatement,
then the seller has an incentive to make
the smallest possible offer. The problem
is that bids and offers are only loosely
tied to the marginal cost of abatement,
which  frustrates  price  discovery  and
efficiency in the EPA auction.
To assure that some quantity is avail-
able at the EPA auction, about 2.8 per-
cent  of  the  allowances  are  withheld
from  the  utilities  and  offered  at  the
auction  at  a  price  of  0. Most of these
allowances are current vintage (so they
can  be  used  in  any  future  year),  but
some  allowances  with  vintages  seven
years in advance are also sold. The auc-
tion  is  held  in  March  of  each  year,
which is peculiar given that the annual
allowance settlement occurs on January
31.
One might think that this flawed auc-
tion  design  would  undermine  the  effi-
ciency  of  the  allowance  market.  How-
ever,  the  authors  argue  convincingly
that the EPA auction is irrelevant. Pri-
vate markets began in the very first year
of trading (1993). By the second year,
still  one  year  before  allowances  were
required, more allowances were traded
in the private market than in the auc-
tion. By 1997, the private market totally
dominated  the  auction,  with  about  98
percent of the allowance trades occur-
ring in the private market. In the first
two years, the auction exhibited a mod-
est amount of price dispersion, reflect-
ing the early price uncertainty. But in
the next four years, the price dispersion
all but vanished. Almost all quantity was
bid within a few percent of the prevail-
ing price in the private market. Hence,
rather than the private market being in-
formed  by  the  EPA  auction,  the  EPA
auction  was  informed  by  the  private
market.  The  downward  bias  on  seller
offers in the EPA auction did not mat-
ter,  since  price  was  set  by  the  buyer
bids at the current private market price.
The irrelevance of the EPA auction is
further seen by the fact that almost no
quantity  is  offered  voluntarily  in  the
EPA auction, and of the small quantity
that is offered less than 1 percent sells.
The  private  markets  that  developed
appeared competitive by the time allow-
ances  were  actually  required  in  1995.
Success  of  the  private  markets  should
not  be  a  surprise.  The  private  market
makers  have  every  incentive  to  satisfy
the needs of the sellers and buyers of
allowances. The task is not too difficult
given  the  large  number  of  sellers  and
buyers,  trading  a  homogeneous  good
on a national basis. Plus, banking of al-
lowances  means  that  there  are  good
substitution possibilities across years.
Although the ineffective EPA auction
did  not  undermine  the  market  for  al-
lowances,  it  would  be  wrong  to  con-
clude  that  there  would  be  little  value
from  good  auction  design.  One  of  the
difficulties is that Congress was too spe-
cific in its language mandating the auc-
tion. As a general rule, Congress should
simply provide agencies with authority
to  conduct  auctions,  specify  the  goal
of the auction, and then let the agency
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innovative FCC spectrum auctions are a
good example. If the EPA developed its
auction  to  promote  price  discovery,  I
suspect that they would have come up
with a different auction. The rules, the
timing, and the packaging likely would
be different.
Cost Savings. An important question
is  whether  the  cap-and-trade  program
resulted  in  cost  savings  relative  to  a
command-and-control  program.  The
authors find abundant evidence that the
utilities  took  advantage  of  the  flexible
trading under Title IV to reduce com-
pliance  costs.  The  command-and-con-
trol  alternative  assumes  a  unit-level
constraint  on  emissions  equal  to  the
unit’s allowances. This is a bit of a straw
man, but it does capture the gains from
flexible trading under Title IV. The es-
timate of savings includes both trading
across  units  and  trading  across  time
(banking). On a present-value basis, the
cost savings over the 13-year horizon is
estimated at $20 billion, compared with
$16  billion  spent  on  emission  reduc-
tions. The estimated cost savings of 55
percent  is  clearly  economically  signifi-
cant. The authors take care in checking
the  sensitivity  of  their  estimate,  and
compare  it  with  other  estimates.  The
conclusion is that emission trading cut
compliance costs by about one-half.
Interestingly,  the  estimated  savings
from banking of $1.4 billion is relatively
modest, but this understates the impor-
tance of banking in the success of the
program. Banking too has important bene-
fits. It improves the ability of the utili-
ties to deal with the fixed constraint in
an uncertain world. Second, it improves
liquidity,  since  allowances  of  different
vintages become close substitutes.
The  market  prices  of  allowances  do
not follow the price path one would ex-
pect  in  a  certain  world.  Prices  started
out at about $140 in 1993, then fell to a
low  of  about  $65  in  1996,  and  then
gradually  increased  to  about  $200  in
1998. In a certain world, we would ex-
pect  prices  to  increase  gradually  with
the rate of interest. The authors argue
that  the  price  path  is  not  a  result  of
flaws in the program, but rather the in-
herent  uncertainty  in  factors  that  gov-
ern  the  supply  and  demand  of  allow-
ances.  The  early  decline  in  price
appears to be the result of overcompli-
ance in response to the falling rail costs.
As  a  result  of  long-term  contracts  it
took  years  for  this  overcompliance  to
correct itself, pushing prices up in the
later  years.  The  volatility  of  allowance
prices does not appear to be out of line
with  what  we  would  expect  from  a
competitive  market  in  an  uncertain
world.
Lessons Learned. The main message
of  the  book  is  that  cap-and-trade  pro-
grams can work, and that Title IV is a
vivid example of a successful program.
The  authors  provide  an  objective  and
convincing  case  for  its  success.  How-
ever, they are careful to emphasize that
the  cap-and-trade  approach  is  not  the
ultimate  solution  to  all  environmental
problems. Rather there are special fea-
tures of SO2 emissions that make them
well  suited  to  the  cap-and-trade  ap-
proach, especially the low-cost accurate
measurement  of  emissions  and  the
ability to conduct a national program.
In terms of politics, the lesson is that
the  efficiency  of  the  program  was  not
undermined by rent seeking over allow-
ance allocations. This is especially wel-
come news, but perhaps is not a general
result.  Intuition  for  the  result  is  that
once a cap is set, it is in the joint inter-
est  of  the  utilities  to  meet  the  cap  at
least cost. In this case, the distributive
issue—allowance allotments—was sepa-
rate from the main efficiency issues—the
absence  of  trade  restrictions,  banking,
and a national program. However, one
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separation may not be so clear. For ex-
ample,  there  might  be  a  tendency  to
use a national cap, when regional caps
are  required  for  efficient  mitigation.
Also there might be excessive reliance
on  voluntary  “opt  in”  features  in  the
face of severe adverse selection.
We also learned that effective private
markets  can  develop  in  favorable  cir-
cumstances.  Here  the  definition  of  al-
lowances, the absence of trading restric-
tions, and the banking of allowances for
use in later years were important.
Another general lesson is that a mar-
ket-based regulatory program is apt to
respond better to the uncertainties of a
changing  world.  The  participants  re-
spond  to  market  price  signals.  If  the
prices  are  right,  then  efficiency  is
achieved. Inflexible command-and-con-
trol  programs  react  much  more  slowly
and less efficiently to new information.
The authors recognize the difficulties
of  constructing  a  successful  cap-and-
trade program. They warn against its in-
discriminate use. This is sensible. How-
ever,  I  would  have  liked  to  have  seen
more on how one might apply cap-and-
trade  in  other  areas.  Carbon  dioxide
(CO2)  emissions  are  mentioned,  but
only  to  point  out  that  these  emissions
come  from  many  more  sources  than
SO2,  and  so  a  cap-and-trade  program
might not be feasible, due to difficulties
in  measurement  and  enforcement.
More  could  be  done  here.  One  can
imagine  an  upstream  CO2  program,
which focuses on the producers of fossil
fuels (refiners, coal mines, etc.). Emis-
sions could be estimated from fuel type,
rather than directly measured. Greater
discussion of a CO2 program would help
clarify  how  the  ideas  presented  here
can be applied elsewhere.
Markets  for  Clean  Air  is  the defini-
tive text on the U.S. acid rain program.
The authors’ analysis is careful and con-
vincing.  The  reader  is  rewarded  with
significant insights about a major envi-
ronmental program. One learns how Ti-
tle  IV  came  to  be  and  what  were  the
consequences of rent seeking in its for-
mation.  One  learns  that  the  program
was  successful  in  cutting  the  costs  of
SO2 emission reductions by about half,
saving  tens  of  billions  of  dollars  over
the life of the program. And one learns
a sound methodology for evaluating the
success  of  an  innovative  market-based
program. Both scholars and policy-mak-
ers  will  have  a  better  sense  of  the
virtues  and  pitfalls  of  market-based
regulation after reading this book.
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